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Abstract
We present a dynamic game of search and learning by fishermen who seek the true
location of a partially observable fish stock. Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns
for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative
are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the
full value of information and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative
faces a free-riding problem as each member prefers another undertake costly search
for information. Contractual agreements among coop members may mitigate, but not
likely eliminate free-riding. Our results explain why information sharing is rare in
fisheries and offer guidance for improving fishery management.
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1 Introduction
Fishermen do not freely share valuable information. Anthropologists describe instead a
culture of secrecy and deceit where fishermen share only coarse (nondescript) information
about the location of productive fishing sites (Palmer (1990), Gatewood (1984), and An-
dersen (1980)). Economists, on the other hand, have argued that information sharing can
increase harvest productivity, avoiding redundant search and costly congestion on the fishing
grounds (Costello and Polasky (2008), Wilen and Richardson (2008), Costello and Deacon
(2007), and Wilson (1990)). Carpenter and Seki (2005) present empirical evidence of in-
creased catch rates among Japanese shrimp fishermen who share information, relative to
their non-cooperating counterparts.1 The two literatures present a puzzle: if information
sharing is beneficial, why is it rare in the fishery? We wish to answer this question for
more than curiosity sake. First, understanding the motivation and possible barriers to infor-
mation sharing may suggest policies that can harness the accompanying economic benefits
suggested by economists. Second, the role of fishing cooperatives has gained new importance
in the design of fisheries management policy in the U.S. and elsewhere. Fishing coopera-
tives are viewed as one method to enhance property rights in fisheries and address common
pool inefficiencies that plague fisheries resources. Understanding information exchange and
coordination within a fishing cooperative is important for designing effective cooperative
management programs.
We develop a simple model of a dynamic fishing game and examine the incentives for fisher-
men to undertake costly search, and share information. We compare Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium information acquisition under alternative institutional structures ranging from indepen-
dent fishermen to a stylized fishing cooperative that utilizes simple contracts to coordinate
the activities of its members. Outcomes under each alternative are compared to first-best
search. We investigate the importance of cooperation, risk preferences, and internal gov-
ernance on search and learning. Our results demonstrate the conditions under which inde-
pendent fishermen and a fishing cooperative can be expected to replicate first-best outcomes.
Our results show that the benefits from information sharing are largest when learning is rel-
atively complete, when congestion penalties are large, when information transmission among
fishermen is costless, and when information about the true location of productive fishing sites
does not quickly decay. A less obvious finding is the importance of free-riding. Our model
emphasizes the role of active and costly information acquisition by fishermen. Steaming to
an uncertain fishing site to learn about its true productivity utilizes fuel, labor and bait,
and importantly, implies time lost fishing at some other site. Once acquired, information
is an excludable and non-rival good, or club good. To prevent free-riding, an information
sharing group must distribute informational rents among its members, while maintaining
incentives to undertake costly search for fish. We show how the extent of the free-riding
problem depends on the contract used to divide information acquisition costs and informa-
tion rents among cooperative members. Devising contracts that result in optimal investment
1The potential gains of cooperation by fishermen have been recognized in U.S. fisheries management
legislation. The Fisheries Collective Marketing Act (FCMA) of 1934 and the American Fisheries Act of 1998
allow the formation of fishing cooperatives. For a deeper discussion see Kitts and Edwards (2003).
2
in information may be particular challenging in fisheries, due to the club good characteristic
of information, its costly acquisition, and the common property nature of the fishery resource.
Our results provide an explanation for the paucity of information sharing and coordinat-
ing efforts in fisheries, and provide important insights for regulators. The 1998 American
Fisheries Act facilitates use of fishing cooperatives as a measure of addressing common pool
inefficiencies that plague commercial fishery resources. Fishing cooperatives are now estab-
lished in several U.S. fisheries.2 An often cited benefit of cooperatives, one that is undoc-
umented but regularly assumed, is that of free information exchange among members. For
example, problems related to bycatch of undesirable or threatened stocks, may be reduced if
cooperating fishermen warn colleagues when and where a non-target stock is present.3 Our
results suggest that policies based on presumption of free information flows among fishing
coop members may fail to reduce bycatch, or address related management problems. We
show which obstacles must be overcome before the information sharing benefits of fishing
cooperatives will materialize.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents further background on in-
formation sharing in fisheries. Section 3 presents our model and derives Bayesian Nash
equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 summarizes the key findings and policy implications, and
discusses extensions.
2 Background
Multiple theories have been offered for why fishermen may or may not share information.
Wilson (1990) suggests fishermen discover productive fishing sites by chance and must then
decide whether or not to divulge their location with members of a fishing club. He suggests
information will be shared if the cost of doing so is not “too large”. That is, when the
number of club members is small, when club members have small catching capacity, and
when transaction costs accompanying information transmission are small. Wilson suggests
further that the benefits of joining the information sharing club increase when club mem-
bers are equally skilled at finding fish and therefore are likely to reciprocate with valuable
information at some future date. The anthropology literature offers similar explanations for
information sharing. Palmer (1990), Gatewood (1984), Orbach (1977), and others suggest
fishermen will be more secretive, when the direct cost of disclosing information is high.4
2According to U.S. Department of Agriculture (2009), there were 37 fishing cooperatives operating in the
U.S. in 2009.
3Management problems, ranging from bycatch, to the design of marine protected areas, have been linked to
problems of information acquisition and information sharing in fisheries (Abbott and Wilen (2010), Marcoul
and Weninger (2008), Costello and Deacon (2007), and Curtis and McConnell (2004)). North Pacific Fishery
Management Council (2011) discuss the use of fishing cooperatives in the Gulf of Alaska Pollock fishery to
reduce incidental catch of Chinook salmon stating, cooperatives will “facilitate information sharing and fleet
coordination that could be important to achieving Chinook avoidance” (pp. 3, emphasis added). Amendment
16 to the Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan, pushes for expansion of the use of fishing
cooperatives (New England Fishery Management Council (2010)).
4Palmer (1990) finds that radio transmissions of Maine lobster fishermen convey detailed information
about lobster size and fishing locations during pre-molting periods when lobster are hidden in rocks and less
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Information sharing and coordination is considered to be profitable. Costello and Deacon
(2007) suggest joining an information sharing group can prevent redundant search under-
taken by independent fishermen (see also Wilson (1990)). A coalition of fishermen, may
benefit from specialization with one or more members carrying out search activities while
others specialize in harvesting fish. Another motive for coordinating fishing activities is to
avoid congestion costs that arise when multiple fishermen visit the same fishing site (MacCall
(1990)).
A common theme in previous literature is that of quid pro quo in information sharing; the
hypothesis is that fishermen will voluntarily disclose information if and only if they receive
something in return. But the criteria for forming an information sharing group must be
more stringent. If there is to be a net expected gain from joining, it must be the case that
expected profits per club member exceed the expected profits when fishermen act alone, i.e.,
there must be a return to scale in information gathering, or alternatively, an information
synergy.5
Previous literature has assumed fishermen are myopic, passive learners (Costello and Deacon
(2007), Lynham (2006), and Smith (2000)). This behavioral assumption precludes costly
investment in information and overlooks the free-riding problem. Researchers tend also to
ignore the internal governance structure of a fishing cooperative, and instead assume that the
incentives of individual cooperative members become fully aligned after joining a fishing coop.
Without this potential source of friction, behavior of the cooperative coincides with that of
as single operator of a firm, in other words, first-best outcomes are assumed rather than
tested. Third, models of active search and learning have featured risk neutral preferences
(Marcoul and Weninger (2008) and Mangel and Clark (1986)). The model introduced next
relaxes these assumptions.
3 Model
Our model features three key elements: uncertainty over true payoffs at competing fishing
locations, the opportunity to actively learn about true productivity, and site congestion costs.
We introduce a two-period game played by two risk neutral fishermen who select from among
two distinct fishing locations, or sites (risk aversion is introduced later). A subscript j dis-
tinguishes the site. To reduce notation, we present the model from the perspective of an
arbitrary player and place a check above variables associated with this players counterpart.
accessible to trap gear, i.e., information is shared when it has little value.
5Gatewood (1984) identifies an example of such a synergy in the Alaskan purse seine fishery, where
managers tightly control the length of openings. The author notes that “While it is true that one boat can
scout as wide an area in four days as four boats can in one day, the utility of the information collected by the
four boats scouting the day before the opening is much greater, provided they share what each has observed”
(pp. 362). It is important to note that the information gathering setting for salmon seiner’s differs from the
one that is modeled in this paper.
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A prime is used to distinguish one-period ahead values.
The sequence of events in the fishing game is as follows. Fishermen choose a fishing site at
date t0 based on their belief about true but uncertain payoffs at each available site. Payoffs
are uncertain due to unobserved true stock abundance, random weather, tides, etc. A fished
site yields a first-fishing-period payoff realization. Fishermen then exploit the information
contained in the first payoff to update beliefs about true payoffs at the fished site. A second
site choice is made at date t1 yielding a second-fishing-period payoff realization.
Payoff uncertainty is modeled as random beliefs about true payoffs. Beliefs are represented
as a normal distribution. For our representative fishermen, current beliefs about the true
payoffs are summarized with parameters, {µ1, ν1, µ2, ν2} where µj denotes the mean pay-
off and νj denotes payoff variance at site j. Current beliefs of the opponent fisherman are
{µˇ1, νˇ1, µˇ2, νˇ2}
The payoff realization from fishing at site j is,
sj = uj + j
where uj is the unobservable true payoff and j is a random term. We assume the distri-
bution of j is known; j ∼ N (0, νs), where νs > 0 denotes signal variance. Signal noise
and therefore payoffs are independently distributed across sites. Realized payoffs are used to
update beliefs about the true payoff distribution following Bayes’ rule. Updating formulas
are presented in A.
Player’s choose a single site in each period. We use a ∈ [0, 1] to denote the probability that
site 1 is chosen by the representative fisherman. We assume fishing at some site is always
preferred to not fishing at all and therefore the probability site 2 is fished is 1 − a. Mixed
strategies are permitted.
Second period payoffs are discounted by a factor δ ∈ [0, 1], assumed common across fisher-
men. Our analysis will feature the extremes of no discounting and myopic fishermen, δ = 1,
and δ = 0, respectively. The impact of δ ∈ (0, 1) is considered in a numerical example later.
Lastly, we assume a fixed, common congestion penalty, denoted κ ≥ 0, which denotes the
amount each players payoffs is reduced when both select the same site during a fishing period.
Each fisherman understands that fishing a site provides information that guides future site
choices, although myopic fishermen will ignore this fact when selecting sites. A component
of the value from visiting a site is the information contained in a realized payoff signal. Much
of the analysis that follows will focus on decisions to undergo costly information acquisition.
We use the terminology investment in information to distinguish a site choice that yields a
lower expected payoff than the alternative site, but high information value. If µi > µj and
site j is part of an optimal fishing strategy, it must be the case that the value of information
from fishing at site j is expected to offset the cost of collecting the catch signal, which is the
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foregone expected payoff, µi − µj > 0.
Site choices are based on beliefs about true fishing payoffs and the strategy played by the
rival fisherman. Payoffs at a site are increasing in own beliefs about true payoff and non-
increasing the likelihood, a conjecture, that the rival will fish at the same site. Conjectures
depend on beliefs about the beliefs, which is a standard feature of Bayesian games.
3.1 First-best
To characterize first-best site choices, we imagine a situation where a single manager directs
each fisherman to a specific site in each period with the goal of maximizing cumulative two-
period, two-fishermen expected profit. The site choice problem is solved recursively. At t1,
two payoff signals are available under three possible first-period scenarios: both fishermen
fished site 1, both fished at site 2, and each fished a different site. We solve the first-best
policy and payoffs for the case where both fishermen fished site 1. Analysis of remaining
cases follows analogously and to conserve space is not repeated.
At t1 the manager compares expected payoffs for each site choice combination based on
current (updated) beliefs. The optimal policy takes a simple form,
a = aˇ = 1 if µ1 − 2κ > µ2
a = aˇ = 0 if µ1 < µ2 − 2κ
a = 1, aˇ = 0 otherwise
(1)
It is convenient to express the above policy in terms of realized signals. Updated beliefs are
linear functions of signals equation (1) and therefore easily inverted. We divide site 1 signals
into mutually exclusive subsets:
S11 = {(s1, sˇ1)| µ1 − 2κ > µ2}
S22 = {(s1, sˇ1)| µ1 < µ2 − 2κ}
S12 = {(s1, sˇ1) /∈ S11 ∪ S22} .
(2)
The expected payoffs for the two fishermen can then be written as,
v∗(s1, sˇ1) =

2µ1 − 2κ if (s1, sˇ1) ∈ S11
2µ2 − 2κ if (s1, sˇ1) ∈ S22
µ1 + µ2 if (s1, sˇ1) ∈ S12
where the conditional dependence of beliefs on the observed signals (s1, sˇ1) is dropped to con-
serve space. In the above expression v∗(s1, sˇ1) denotes the optimal aggregate, two-fisherman
expected payoff, conditional on having obtained signals (s1, sˇ1) in the first fishing period.
Now step back to the date t0 site choice problem. Let V
∗(i, jˇ) denote the two-period expected
payoff from sending one fisherman to site i and the other to site j in the first period. Sending
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both to site 1 yields,
V ∗(1, 1ˇ) = 2µ1 − 2κ+ δEs1,sˇ1|µ1,ν1 [v∗′(s1, sˇ1)],
where Es1,sˇ1|µ1,ν1 is the expectations operator conditional on t0 beliefs. Similarly, we have,
V ∗(2, 2ˇ) = 2µ2 − 2κ+ δE[v∗′(s2, sˇ2)]
V ∗(1, 2ˇ) = µ1 + µ2 + δE[v∗′(s1, sˇ2)].
In the above and hereafter we use E = Esj ,sˇj |µj ,νj to denote the conditional expectations
operator.
The first-best expected payoff is then,
V ∗ = max
{
V ∗(i, jˇ)
}
i, j = 1, 2.
There are features of first-best site choices and payoffs worth noting. Suppose µ1 > µ2.
The manager will invest in one signal from site 2 if and only if V ∗(1, 2ˇ) > V ∗(1, 1ˇ) and
V ∗(1, 2ˇ) > V ∗(2, 2ˇ). By manipulating these expressions we can derive a bound on the
investment cost for which sending one fisherman to uncertain site 2 is optimal:
δ
{
E[v∗′(s2, sˇ2)]−E[v∗′(s1, sˇ2)]
}
− κ < µ1− µ2 < δ
{
E[v∗′(s1, sˇ2)]−E[v∗′(s1, sˇ1)]
}
+ κ. (3)
The expression in (3) indicates that one signal will be collected when the investment cost is
bound between the discounted total expected net gain from the collecting a second signal at a
site. Two signals are warranted if and only if the added cost is less than the discounted total
expected gain from more information. We see that the full costs and benefits of information
are internalized. If δ = 0, myopic decision making, no investments in information are
undertaken. Lastly, congestion κ > 0 expands the belief space for which a single investment
in information is optimal.
3.2 Independent fishermen
We assume independent fishermen choose sites simultaneously and non-cooperatively. At
date t1 each observes the site that was fished by his counterpart in the first fishing period.
We assume the realized payoff is private information. To solve the model, we must specify
what each fisherman believes about the beliefs of his counterpart. Suppose for a moment
fishermen believe they have different beliefs at t0. In this case, each must then believe his
counterpart holds biased beliefs. If not, his own beliefs should be updated to incorporate
the unbiased information. While our model can accommodate different initial beliefs, a mo-
tivation for non-congruent initial beliefs is not obvious. We therefore solve for a symmetric
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium assuming common beliefs at date t0. As above the site
choice problem is solved recursively.
Suppose our representative fisherman chose site j in the first fishing period. Consider the
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following date t1 strategy profile,
fish site i if sj < s
L
a ∈ (0, 1) if sL ≤ sj ≤ sU
fish site j if sj > s
U .
(4)
We assume both fishermen play similar strategies. In the above expression sL and sU demar-
cate regions of the signal space and can be explained with the help of an example. Suppose
both fishermen fished site 1 in the first period. A fisherman who receives a high payoff at
site 1 may favor at return trip. However, if both fishermen fished site 1 each must deduce
that his opponent likely also received a high payoff, and is therefore also likely to return in
the second fishing period. This will result in congestion and a reduced payoffs. The upper
threshold sU is the payoff that is sufficiently large such that the representative fisherman
is indifferent between returning to site 1 as a pure strategy and adopting a mixed strategy.
In other words, a sufficiently high payoff from site 1 will lead to a return trip regardless of
impending congestion cost. As intuition would suggest, sU is a non-decreasing function of
congestion cost, κ.
By similar arguments, a particularly low signal from site 1 favors a switch to site 2 in the sec-
ond period. sL is the threshold signal at which the representative fisherman is just indifferent
between switching sites as a pure strategy and adopting a mixed strategy. Upon receiving
an intermediate payoff, the fisherman must deduce that his counterpart likely also received
an intermediate payoff. Updated beliefs of both fishermen then suggest that congestion is
likely and therefore a mixed strategy is played.
The profile in equation (4) determines the period 2 site choice for all possible first period
signals. The expected payoff at t1, conditional on both fishermen fishing site 1 in the first
period, is given as,
v(s1, E[sˇ1]) =

µ1 − aˇκ if s1 > sU
µ2 − (1− aˇ)κ if s1 < sL
a(µ1 − aˇκ) + (1− a)(µ2 − (1− aˇ)κ) if sL ≤ s1 ≤ sU
where the conditional dependence of beliefs on the observed signal s1 is dropped to conserve
space. As sˇ1 is the private information of the representative fisherman’s counterpart, the
term E[sˇ1] in v(·) captures the representative fisherman’s best belief about this private in-
formation based on his date t1 Bayesian updated beliefs. Expected payoffs at t1 for other
first period site choice combinations are derived similarly.
We now step back and consider date t0 choices. The strategy profile introduced above
outlines a best response for all payoff realizations and allows us to determine the two-period
expected payoff for all site choice strategies. As an example, suppose both fishermen select
site 1 at t0. The expected payoff for the representative fishermen is,
V (1, 1ˇ) = µ1 − κ+ δE
[
v′(s1, E[sˇ1])
]
(5)
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The fisherman conditions his expected future payoffs on his best belief about the payoff
signal observed by his rival. This knowledge is incorporated into his conjecture about the
probable action of his rival in the second fishing period. The remaining cases are calculated
similarly and take the form,
V (1, 2ˇ) = µ1 + δE
[
v′(s1, E[sˇ2])
]
(6)
V (2, 1ˇ) = µ2 + δE
[
v′(s2, E[sˇ1])
]
(7)
V (2, 2ˇ) = µ2 − κ+ δE
[
v′(s2, E[sˇ2])
]
(8)
Using the conditional expected payoffs in equations (5) − (8), we can construct a 2 × 2
normal form representation of the date t = 0 site choice game. The Perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (PBNE) fishing strategy of this normal form game is,
a =

1 if V (1, 1ˇ) > V (2, 1ˇ) and V (1, 2ˇ) > V (2, 2ˇ)
0 if V (2, 2ˇ) > V (1, 2ˇ) and V (2, 1ˇ) > V (1, 1ˇ)
V (2,2ˇ)−V (1,2ˇ)
V (1,1ˇ)−V (2,1ˇ)+V (2,2ˇ)−V (1,2ˇ) otherwise
The maximum expected payoff for an independent fisherman is given as,
V I = a
[
aˇV (1, 1ˇ) + (1− aˇ)V (1, 2ˇ)
]
+ (1− a)
[
aˇV (2, 1ˇ) + (1− aˇ)V (2, 2ˇ)
]
3.3 Inefficiency of Independent Search
This section contrasts PBNE and first-best site choice strategies over a range of initial beliefs
about payoffs. We characterize inefficient search, which takes the form of over- or under-
investment in information by non-cooperating fishermen.
Figure 1 reports numerical solutions for the first-best (left-hand panels) and perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (PBNE) policies (right-hand panels), over a subset of the belief space. Be-
liefs for which a visit to site 2 implies an investment in information are featured. The top
panels report results for the baseline calibration6 Panels (c) and (d) report results for an
increase in the congestion costs, panels (e) and (f) for an increase on the signal noise, and
panels (g) and (h) for an increase in discount rate.
Units on the horizontal axis are the ratio of mean payoffs µ1/µ2. Units on the vertical axis
are the ratio of payoff uncertainty at site 2 relative to site 1, ν2/ν1. Beliefs at the two sites
are identical at the origin. Moving left to right raises the cost of investing in information at
site 2 and moving vertically corresponds to higher uncertainty at site 2 and thus a potentially
increased upside value of investing in information.
6We set µ2 = 100, ν1 = 3 and κ = 0.5. µ1 is varied between 100 and 110; ν2 ranges between 3 and 48.
Payoff signal variance is νs = 2.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Site Choices - Risk Neutrality
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Marcoul and Weninger (2008) show in a single agent model that for a given investment cost
there will exist a threshold payoff uncertainty at which an investment in information be-
comes optimal. The equilibrium policies in Figure 1 illustrate this feature of the site choice
problem. We have separated the belief space into regions. In Region 0, no investments in
information are made. Region I, in the first-best panels, denote beliefs for which a single
investment in information is optimal. Finally, Region II contains the set of beliefs where the
first-best policy sends two fishermen to site 2 to gather information. For non-cooperative
fishermen we calculate total investments in information as the sum of the probability that
an investment is made. Recall that independent fishermen play a mixed strategy over a
fairly wide range of the belief space, and therefore under the PBNE strategy region I is
shown as the dashed line. Mixed strategies are continuous in beliefs and therefore expected
investments in information exceed unity for beliefs to the north and west of the dashed line
are less than unity for beliefs to the south and east of the dashed line.
To gain some intuition for the results, examine the first-best policy under the baseline pa-
rameters (panel (a)). For beliefs in region II, both fishermen are sent to uncertain site 2 to
gather information. This is optimal because the cost of collecting the information is low and
the value of signals in terms of guiding second period site choice is high. As the cost of the
information increases, moving left to right, or if uncertainty at site 2 is less, it is optimal
to collect one signal from site 2. For beliefs in the south east region 0, no investments in
information are made as the costs outweigh the benefits.
Next compare the first-best results in panel (a) and the PBNE results in panel (b). The
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location and shape of the boundaries that define intensity of information investment differ.
Region II (two investments in information) is larger for non-cooperating fishermen, indicating
over-investment in information relative to the first-best policy. The reason non-cooperating
fishermen over-invest is because information, once gathered, is a public good that should be
freely shared among the two fishermen. Because it is not in the independent case, redundant
information and added cost are incurred, relative to the first-best. This result confirms the
insights of Costello and Deacon (2007) who suggest non-cooperation can lead to excessive
or redundant search, alternatively, cooperation can eliminate excessive or redundant search
for fish.
Further comparison however reveals that beliefs exist for which independent fishermen under-
invest in information relative to the first-best policy. Region 0 (no information investment)
is larger under the PBNE policy than under the first-best policy. The reason is that inde-
pendent fishermen each incur the cost of gathering information but do not share the benefit.
When both fishermen benefit from information under the first-best, there exists a higher
cost threshold at which information investment is optimal.
Panels (c) and (d) reveal that higher congestions costs shrink regions 0 and II, i.e, the belief
space where both fishermen fish at the same site. Put another way, higher congestion costs
expand the region of beliefs for which a single investment is optimal under the first-best
policy. This results is not surprising since congesting a site is now more costly. Panels
(e) and (f) show that less information investment is undertaken when catch signal noise
increases, while results in panels (g) and (h), show that less investment occurs under a
higher discount rate. Again an expected result. A comparison of the fist-best and PBNE
policies reveals as above regions where non-cooperating fishermen over- and under-invest in
information relative to the first-best policy.
3.4 Risk aversion
In this section we examine the effects of risk averse preferences on site choices. Assume
preferences follow a negative exponential utility function,
U(s) = 1− exp(−λs)
where s is the realized payoff and λ > 0 is a risk preference parameter.7
As above suppose fisherman are have less information about the true payoff at site 2. A
decision to gather information at an uncertain site now carries an added current period cost
in the form of exposure to a risky payoff. On the other hand, with multiple fishing periods,
active learning reduces uncertainty which reduces exposure to future risk. A first-period
investment in information reduces payoff uncertainty in the second period in addition to
providing information that guides site choice. The net effect of risk aversion on the demand
7The negative exponential function has several attractive properties. It exhibits constant absolute risk
aversion. As λ→ 0 preferences are consistent with risk neutrality. Utility lies in the interval (0, 1). Finally,
simple expressions for expected utility exist.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Site Choices - Risk Aversion (λ = 0.1)
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for information is therefore ambiguous in a dynamic setting (Freixas and Kihlstrom, 1984).
Figure 2 reports the first-best and PBNE policies for a subset of beliefs under negative expo-
nential utility (λ = 0.1) and the baseline parameters.8 The units of the axes are unchanged,
and hold the same meaning as above.
A first observation is that there is less investment in information under risk averse prefer-
ences. The results show at most a single visit to uncertain site 2 is made under the first-best
policy. The maximum cost warranting an investment in information is 1.03, or a 3% reduc-
tion in the expected payoff. Independent fishermen are also less willing to expose themselves
to risk; gathering information at site 2 is optimal over a smaller range of the belief space.
A second observation is non-monotonicity in the demand for information. At low levels of
uncertainty, an increase in the cost of gathering information can be offset by an increase
in information value. As payoff variance increases however the disutility associated with
high risk payoffs outweigh information value. The boundary between regions of the belief
space, which may be interpreted as payoff mean and variance indifference curves, becomes
negatively sloped; fishermen are willing to expose themselves to high risk payoffs only if the
utility cost of learning is small.
As with risk neutral preferences investments in information under the PBNE policy is inef-
ficient. Relative the the first-best policy, independent fishermen over-invest in information
in some regions of the belief space and under-invest in others.
3.5 Fishing cooperatives
In the first-best analysis above, fishermen are directed to sites by a fictitious manager. This
construct ignores crucial characteristics that distinguish cooperatives from owner-investor
firms. Two that are of particular relevance for costly information gathering are decision
rights within the organization, and the residual claims on earnings. In this section we
consider simple, but illustrative, examples of internal governance structures that might be
operational in a real-world fishing cooperative. Our goal is to illustrate some key challenges
8First-best utility is calculated as U = 1−exp(−λ(s+ sˇ). Our selection of λ does not qualitatively change
our results.
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that must be overcome in fishing cooperatives before efficient search is achieved.9
In the context of our fishing problem, the right to decide which site is fished by individual
cooperative members will have important welfare and efficiency implications. In what follows
we do not consider a formal assignment of decision rights. Instead, we discuss, informally,
the implications of decision rights such as majority rule or unanimous voting by cooperative
members.
Suppose cooperative members are compensated for their fishing efforts under a piece-meal
remuneration contract (McConnell and Price (2006)). Each fisherman receives a per-period
payment, which we denote ω, plus a share, α, of the payoff realized at a fished site. Under
this scheme, the expected single-period payoff from fishing are site j is,
ω + αµj
Following some preliminary analysis we will consider a profit sharing arrangement where
ω is determined by the aggregate payoffs earned by all cooperative members. This simple
setup is general enough to capture egalitarian profit-sharing or full retention of the payoff
at a site. We next show that a preference for exploitation over exploration will arise under
a remuneration contract that allows fishermen to retain a disproportionate share of their
realized fishing payoff.
3.5.1 Site choice in a fishing cooperative
Assume risk neutral members of a fishing cooperative share common initial beliefs about
true payoffs at competing sites. Suppose beliefs satisfy µ1 > µ2 and ν1 < ν2. The coop-
erative fishermen are capable of solving for the first-best site choice policy and agree that
the first-best policy yields the highest expected payoffs for the cooperative. What is less
clear is the mechanism that determines where each coop member will fish, how payoffs are
distributed, and which internal governance structure can implement the first-best site choice
policy.
No tension will arise if the first-best policy sends both fishermen to the same site. We
therefore focus on the case where it is optimal, under the first-best, to send one fisherman
to each site in the first period. Suppose also that there is no congestion penalty. With no
congestion costs, the period 2 payoffs will be the same for both fishermen since both will fish
at the highest expected payoff site in period 2. Lastly, suppose ω is used to redistribute the
total earnings back to cooperating fishermen, and that the coop balances its budget in each
period. Each member retains an α share of his own fishing payoff. With two fishermen, the
residual that is re-distributed (equally) to each member is (1− α)(s1 + sˇ2).
9Our approach follows the “new institutional economics” viewpoint which emphasizes the role of trans-
actions costs, property rights and agency relationships for understanding the organizational structure (Fama
(1980), Williamson (1975), and Alchian and Demsetz (1972)). A comprehensive review of contracts that
might be used to assign rights and residual claims within a fishing cooperative is beyond the scope of this
paper. See Fama and Jensen (1983) for additional discussion of contracting in producer organizations.
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In expectation, a cost µ1 − µ2 must be incurred to obtain information about site 2’s true
payoff. Our assumption for profit redistribution implies an expected wage,
ω =
(1− α)
2
(µ1 + µ2).
Simple algebra finds that the first period payoff for the fisherman who exploits the relatively
certain site 1 is,
1
2
(µ1 + µ2) +
α
2
(µ1 − µ2), (9)
whereas, the payoff for the fisherman who explores the uncertain site 2 is,
1
2
(µ1 + µ2)− α
2
(µ1 − µ2). (10)
These expressions simply illustrate that for α > 0, coop members will prefer exploitation
over exploration, i.e., each will prefer that some other member be responsible for investments
in information.10 Each coop member has an incentive to free-ride on the costly search efforts
of others.
A broader question is how free-riding impedes the cooperative’s ability to implement first-
best site choices. The issue here is the extent to which the internal distribution of information
rents and costs distort site choices. To demonstrate, Figure 3 shows the full expected pay-
offs under the first-best, and when remuneration follows a piece-meal contract with α > 0.
Uncertainty is fixed, with ν1 < ν2. Units on the horizontal axis are µ1 − µ2 which in-
crease moving left to right. As above, the cost of gathering information at uncertain site
2 increases moving left to right in the figure, but now the cost increases are in absolute terms.
Panel (a) in Figure 3 reports the first-best two-period expected payoffs to the cooperative
for different first period site choices. These curves are, respectively, the expected payoff from
sending both fishermen to site 1 and sending one fishermen to site 2 to gather information.
The first-best policy is determined by the maximum of V ∗(1, 1ˇ) and V ∗(1, 2ˇ). For investment
costs below f , i.e., beliefs for which the perceived cost of collecting information from uncer-
tain site 2 is not too large, it is optimal under the first best policy to send one fishermen to
site 2.
Panel (b) depicts expected payoffs under a piece-meal contract with α > 0. Following our
notational convention V (1, 1ˇ) is the two-period expected payoff for the representative fisher-
man when both fish at site 1. V (2, 1ˇ) is the two-period expected payoff if the representative
fisherman visits uncertain site 2 and V (1, 2ˇ) denotes his two-period expected payoff if the
counterpart visits the uncertain site in the first fishing period. Given the symmetry of beliefs,
the two-period expected payoffs to the counterpart are identical. Panel (b) clearly illustrates
10This holds under risk aversion as well. Let pi12 =
1
2 (s1+ sˇ2)+
α
2 (s1− sˇ2) and pi12 = 12 (s1+ sˇ2)− α2 (s1− sˇ2).
pi12 and pi21 are random variables. Using the convolution of s1 and sˇ2 we can derive the mean and variance for
these random payoffs and compute the corresponding expected utilities. Given our assumptions on beliefs,
E[pi12] > E[pi21] and V ar[pi12] < V ar[pi21], which imply EU [pi12] > EU [pi21].
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Figure 3: Conditional Two-Period Expected Payoffs
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the source of internal conflict within the cooperative. The exploiting fisherman benefits from
an investment in information for investment costs are below g, and is likely to support a
policy that sends some other fisherman to site 2. The fisherman assigned to explore the
uncertain site will be willing to do so only for investment costs in the range 0 to e. Further
calculations reveal,
e =
f
1 + α
and g =
f
1− α,
which demonstrate a clear trade-off between a performance-based remuneration and poten-
tial internal conflict over site choice. Whether this conflict leads to inefficient search will
depend on the specific decision rights used to direct members to alternate sites and the size
of the fishing cooperative. Suppose there are more than two fishermen in the cooperative.
If, for example site choices are determined by a 50% majority vote of cooperating fishermen,
investments in information with costs in the range e to g would be determined democrat-
ically; a potential over-investment in information will occur for perceived investment cost
between f and g. If, alternatively, all cooperative fishermen must agree on the site choice
plan, i.e., exploration may occur only for costs in the range 0 to e in Figure 3. In either case,
site choices determined by voting rights can diverge from the first-best plan. Of course, this
will result in lower total payoffs than under the first-best.
Can the piece-meal contract be modified to remedy the free-riding problem? Suppose for
example a fee is charged to fishermen who are the net beneficiaries of investments in in-
formation, and a subsidy is paid to fishermen who bear the burden of costly search. In
order for fishermen to be indifferent between exploration and exploitation, the first-period
remuneration must be equalized. From equations (9) and (10) we find that the fee collected
from the exploiting fishermen and transferred to the exploring fishermen must fully offset
the retained profits at each fishing site. In other words, the fee and subsidy must counter
the effect of the residual claim on realized fishing payoffs. A system of fees and subsidies
that removes the free-riding problem and reproduces the first-best must correspond to the
case of α = 0, i.e., fishermen remuneration is independent of the realized fishing payoffs at
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the sites at which they fish.
Similar insights obtain under alternate parameterizations of the model, and under risk averse
preferences. Internal disagreement over site choices, driven by the incentive to free ride will
affect the site choice and ultimately catch performance of a fishing cooperative. Congestions
costs, signal noise, discount rates and risk preferences will affect level of disagree, along with
the form of contract used to distribute fishing profits among coop members.
4 Conclusions
We have introduced a dynamic game of information sharing in a fishery with incomplete infor-
mation about payoffs at competing fishing sites. We contrast first-best and non-cooperative
site choice policies under various model parameters and risk preferences. We show that
privately optimal investments in information by non-cooperating fishermen diverge from
first-best investment over a range of beliefs about true payoffs at competing sites. Our
results confirm that non-cooperating fishermen engage in redundant and inefficient search
over a subset of the belief space (Costello and Deacon (2007)). Non-cooperating fishermen
under-invest in information relative to the first-best in other regions of the belief space. The
simple intuition for the divergence between the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium policies
we study and first-best outcomes is that information, once collected, is a public good that
should be made available to all fishermen. When information value is shared among multiple
fishermen, as in our first-best scenario, a lower benefit threshold is required before costly
information gathering proceeds.
Our analysis shows that while fishermen can benefit from sharing information about produc-
tive fishing sites and coordinating site choices to avoid congestion, free-riding problems can
detract from the potential gains. We show how the level of efficiency attained in a cooperative
of fishermen will depend on the internal governance structure of the organization. Remuner-
ation schemes must be designed to distribute information rents while maintaining incentives
to undertake costly search in order to replicate first-best outcomes. Devising such schemes
can be particularly challenging in fisheries, e.g., eliminating free-riding problems may be
inconsistent with performance-based remuneration schemes. Egalitarian profit-sharing can
overcome the free-riding problem, but requires full disclosure, and likely costly monitoring,
of costs incurred by individual cooperative members.
Extensions of the current analysis to formally study membership decisions under an endoge-
nous contract design, and strategic information disclosure may provide additional insights
and explanations for the paucity of information sharing in fisheries. In particular, deceit
is common among commercial fishermen (Palmer (1990), Gatewood (1984), and Andersen
(1980)). Identifying conditions under which truthtelling is an equilibrium strategy in an
information sharing game could provide more insight.
It is now recognized that solutions to global depletion of marine fish stocks will likely require
some form of strengthened property rights for resource users (Costello et al. (2008)). Fishing
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cooperatives are considered a form of enhanced property rights capable of addressing var-
ious inefficiencies that plague common pool resources (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (2010)). Cooperatives are being considered as potential solutions to other
management problems including bycatch of unwanted species (North Pacific Fishery Man-
agement Council (2011)). Our results suggest that the ability of fishing cooperatives to
remedy fishery management problems requires further study. Forming a cooperative does
not guarantee a solution to free-riding and other agency problems. Our results illustrate
information sharing incentives within fishing cooperatives, and offer insights that may help
policy makers faced with the difficult problem of designing effective management policies in
marine fisheries.
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A Belief Updating
The three possible updating scenarios are possible in our model: no signal, one signal and
two catch signals from a site. Under the independence assumption, updated beliefs at site i
conditional on signal sj are equal to the prior belief. For prior beliefs µj, νj and single catch
signal sj updated beliefs at site j are given as,
µ′j |sj = θjµj + (1− θj)sj
ν ′j |sj = θjνj
where θj =
νs
νj+νs
. When two signals are available from site j updated beliefs are given as,
µ′j |sj, sˇj = θjµj + (1− θj)s¯j
ν ′j |sj, sˇj = θjνj
where θj =
νs
2νj+νs
and s¯j denotes the average payoff signal observed at site j.
B Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
This section solves the date t1 Bayesian game for independent, expected utility maximizing
fishermen. Risk neutrality is a special case of this solution (λ→ 0). We solve for the thresh-
olds sU , sL, sˇU , and sˇL from (4) which separate feasible signals into regions where pure and
mixed strategies are played. There are four possible scenarios to consider depending on the
period 1 site choices. We present the calculations for the case where both fishermen fish site
1 in the first fishing period. The analysis of the remaining cases follows analogously and is
not repeated.
We begin by specifying how fishermen form beliefs about beliefs. Since both fishermen
fished site 1 in the first period, their belief about their rival’s private information should be
a function of their own private information from fishing site 1. That is, the best information
available about the other fisherman’s private signal comes from their own updated beliefs.
As such, each fisherman believes they share the same updated beliefs about sites 1 and 2.
Suppose sˇU and sˇL exist such that the representative fisherman’s counterpart plays the
strategy outlined in equation (4). For the representative fishermen with s1 ∈ [sL, sU ] to
play a mixed strategy, a′ ∈ (0, 1), it must be the case that based on his conjecture about his
counterpart’s strategy he is indifferent between fishing site 1 and site 2. Setting the expected
utility of fishing these sites equal and solving for aˇ′, we find,
aˇ′ =
µ′1 − µ′2 − λ2 (ν ′1 − ν ′2)− κ+ 2κPr
(
sˇ1 < sˇ
U |s1
)
2κPr (sˇL ≤ sˇ1 ≤ sˇU |s1) ∀ s1 ∈ [s
L, sU ] (11)
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Using the same method, we can calculate the mixed fishing strategy for the representative
fisherman, a′.
In a BNE, each player’s action must be optimal subject to their Bayesian updated belief
about the strategy of their rival. Using a′ and aˇ′ we derive four equations that define the
parameters sU , sL, sˇU , and sˇL that will satisfy a BNE.
The representative fisherman believes that his counterpart is indifferent between mixing and
fishing site 1 when aˇ′ exactly equals one (his counterpart knows that this is the representative
fisherman’s belief). For site 1 to be strictly dominant, it must be that it is still preferred
even under the worst case (when both fish the site). Using this fact, the updating rules
in A, and the strategy profile in equation (4), the representative fisherman’s upper signal
threshold sU must satisfy,
sU =
1
1− θ1
{[
µ2 − θ1µ1
]− λ
2
[
ν2 − θ1ν1
]
+ κ
}
(12)
Similarly, the representative fisherman believes that his counterpart is indifferent between
mixing and fishing site 2 when aˇ′ exactly equals zero (his counterpart knows that this is the
representative fisherman’s belief). For site 2 to be strictly dominant, it must be that it is
still preferred even under the worst case (when both fish the site). Using this fact and given
the strategy profile, the representative fisherman’s lower signal threshold sL must satisfy,
sL =
1
1− θ1
{[
µ2 − θ1µ1
]− λ
2
[
ν2 − θ1ν1
]− κ} (13)
Using the same argument, we construct the following for the representative fisherman’s
counterpart,
sˇU =
1
1− θˇ1
{[
µˇ2 − θˇ1µˇ1
]− λ
2
[
νˇ2 − (1− θˇ1)νˇ1
]
+ κ
}
(14)
sˇL =
1
1− θˇ1
{[
µˇ2 − θˇ1µˇ1
]− λ
2
[
νˇ2 − (1− θˇ1)νˇ1
] − κ} (15)
The thresholds that satisfy the BNE , sU , sL, sˇU , and sˇL, defined by equations (12) - (15),
must simultaneously hold.
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